Callen, thank you so much for your praise and comments!
Giving the council Veto power for proposals may cause apathy amongst participants and also undermine the decentralization of the DAO. Furthermore, it would be great to get more information as to what their Veto abilities extend to? There is a conflict of interest if they are elected, fired, and funded by governance, but they can Veto governance decisions that could affect them.
I think it could be more beneficial and less of a burden on the council to act as a steward of the DAO and help facilitate successful “Temp Checks” to formal proposals which is then decided on by all the stakeholders.
There’s a lot to unpack here 
The most important issue you’re raising is that indeed, councils shouldn’t be able to block governance decisions, including and especially decisions to revoke council members, or even a whole council (this issue was also raised here). We intend to fix the loophole in the “Establishing Governance Process” proposal, by enabling token holders to bypass councils for submitting and voting proposals, as long as they gather a support of at least 10% of the circulating supply.
It’s also important that governance decisions are triggered by an independent body. If the governance can vote without the authorization of the Ecosystem Council but then cannot enforce its decision, the problem is still unsolved. Since we’ll be using Snapshot at launch, governance’s decisions such as adding/removing councils’ signers will be enacted by the DAO’s multisig. Hence, we need to have signers that are publicly known and credibly independent from the councils.
Another thing you’re pointing out is the risk to cause participants’ apathy and to undermine the decentralization of the DAO. This observation goes beyond the question of who can post proposals. I do acknowledge that the council model we’re supporting comes with a degree of operational centralization that is not often explicitly stated in DAOs. It’s an intentional design, that doesn’t go necessarily against decentralization.
Most DAOs suffer from voters’ apathy and decentralization theater, even when participation of token holders is supported and encouraged. We think that delegating operational power to a group of elected individuals is a great way to address these issues. Voters are summoned to vote only on critical and strategic decisions, as opposed to countless technical matters requiring time and expertise that most don’t have. We expect less voters’ fatigue as a result. Also, having elected people with a clearly scoped, time and budget-limited mandate makes the system less prone to be manipulated by charismatic individuals or by an independent company or foundation.
Finally, you’re mentioning the role of stewards that councils could play in this context. I wholeheartedly agree! Maybe something was lost in the way it’s been phrased, but this is actually the intent behind the paragraph that you’re quoting! Councils have the duty to collect and process signals from the community, especially when they are submitted as temp check proposals, and to facilitate their implementation. It’s not an option. Yes, ultimately they have the right to reject proposals to prevent abuses, but that is a secondary feature of the model. If we give token holders a way to call for a vote (as discussed above), this right is no longer absolute.
One last consideration: along with the ability to post temp checks on the forum, it might be a good idea to invite token holders and the community at large to directly share suggestions to the councils. Not everything need to be voted by the general governance, as already discussed. Implementation of some community-sourced ideas could also be directly steered by councils.
Do you expect subjective voting power to cause issues within the builders group concerning the distribution of voting power and politics? It could potentially be good for the DAO to establish at least a tier system to allocate VP according to full-time/part-time in which members decide who receives a specific tier.
This topic has been debated by builders. The selected system results from this debate, and there’s no subjective evaluation of the VP. I recently added more details on the forum about it, that you can find in this link. I think that the system described here matches what you were suggesting. Let me know if that’s not the case!