This proposal outlines the process for the second elections of the Protocol and Ecosystem Councils of Mangrove DAO. Its aim is to simplify the electoral procedure by establishing a list-based voting system.
2. Rationale
During the first council election, every candidate was individually invited to introduce themselves on the forum. We would like to consider another option: electing a list instead of voting for individual members. The expected benefit is to ensure that the council has all the required skills. Additionally, there will likely be fewer options to choose from, making it easier for voters and limiting last-minute cancellations.
3. Specification
Mission and Required Skills of Councils
The Mission and Required Skills of Councils have not changed:
Protocol Council: Focuses on maintaining the Mangrove protocol, overseeing research, product management, devops, security operations, and technical enforcement of governance decisions. Required skills include expertise in Mangrove technology, Ethereum/EVM technology, Web security, and crypto.
Ecosystem Council: Responsible for economic and social aspects, including strategy curation, partnership management, and treasury oversight. Required skills encompass protocol and product design, DAO governance and operations, treasury management, marketing and communication, business development, and developer relations.
Mandate Period and Compensation
The Council members of the elected cohort will serve for approximately six months (Q4 2024 & Q1 2025), starting from the vote closure to March 31, 2025.
Compensation is set at 2500 MGV per month.
Duties and Expectations
The Mission and Required Skills of Councils have not changed:
Ecosystem Council members are expected to dedicate about 5 to 10 hours per month to their roles.
Protocol Council members are expected to dedicate about 2 to 4 hours per month to their roles.
Each member should oversee at least one area of concern for the DAO and provide monthly reports on their area.
Members will also be signers of the council’s multisig, participating regularly in transaction signing.
Council members are expected to engage actively in the DAO’s initiatives, contributing to discussions, decision-making, and the overall growth and health of the ecosystem.
Election Process
The elections will take the form of list-based voting following the electoral calendar:
Monday, September 23, 2024. Publication this proposal on the governance forum.
September 23 – Friday, October 4, 2024, at 7pm UTC. Lists are required to apply by responding to this proposal on the Mangrove DAO gov forum.
Monday, October 7. Publish the snapshot vote over a period of 5 days.
Friday, October 11. Publication of the results on the Mangrove DAO gov forum.
While the idea of moving to a list-based voting system for the second elections of the Protocol and Ecosystem Councils of Mangrove DAO may simplify certain aspects of the electoral process, there are several key concerns that should be considered before implementing such a change.
Lack of Accountability: By shifting from individual candidates to list-based voting, there is a risk of diluting personal accountability. In the first election, individual candidates introduced themselves and were responsible for their actions and decisions. With lists, voters may find it harder to hold specific individuals accountable if the council does not perform effectively, as responsibility becomes dispersed across the entire list.
Consolidation of Power: Allowing the election of lists rather than individuals could lead to a consolidation of power within certain groups or factions within the DAO. The people or organizations assembling the lists wield significant influence in deciding who gets included, potentially sidelining qualified but less connected individuals. This could limit the diversity of perspectives in council decision-making.
Voter Disengagement: One of the expected benefits of list-based voting mentioned in the proposal is that it could make the process simpler for voters by reducing the number of options. However, this simplification may also disengage voters, who may feel less invested in researching or understanding the individuals on the list. Voters might end up voting for lists based on reputation or name recognition rather than the qualifications or contributions of the candidates themselves.
Transparency Concerns: The process for forming these lists is not explicitly outlined in the proposal. Who selects the candidates for these lists? Without a clear, transparent process, there is a risk that the lists could be formed through closed-door decisions, undermining the democratic principles that the DAO aims to uphold.
Minority Representation: In a list-based system, minority voices or alternative perspectives may struggle to find representation. The list is often formed by a majority or influential group, leaving out diverse opinions that could contribute to the development of the DAO. This could result in underrepresentation of important voices, especially in a diverse and dynamic space like Web3 and decentralized governance.
Inflexibility for Voters: Voting for lists rather than individuals removes flexibility for voters who may support certain individuals but disagree with others on the same list. Voters are forced to accept an entire package, which might include candidates they do not fully support. This “all-or-nothing” approach could limit voter choice and ultimately alienate members of the DAO.
Potential for Favoritism and Patronage: The proposal mentions that this new system could reduce the risk of last-minute cancellations and ensure that required skills are represented within the council. However, there is a risk that those assembling the lists could favor loyalists or allies, further entrenching existing power structures. This could reduce opportunities for fresh voices to emerge and contribute to the DAO’s growth.
In conclusion, while the intentions behind this proposal are understandable, I am strongly against adopting a list-based system for the elections. The risks of diminished accountability, consolidation of power, voter disengagement, and a lack of transparency far outweigh the potential benefits. Such a system could lead to a governance structure that is less democratic, less inclusive, and more prone to favoritism, ultimately undermining the principles upon which Mangrove DAO is built. A different approach, such as maintaining individual accountability while simplifying the process in other ways, would be far more beneficial to the long-term health of the DAO.
Important note: Such a significant change should be implemented through a dedicated proposal and undergo thorough community discussion before any decision is made. Failing to do so would imply that this DAO structure is merely a distraction and an undercover mechanism for consolidating control, rather than truly representing the decentralized, democratic principles it claims to uphold.
I’ll speak for myself: the design of our DAO structure (with councils) is meant to increase agility and minimize bureaucracy. Recourses to the general governance should be limited to critical matters, issues that may lead to a loss/bad use of the DAO’s funds, or a capture of its governance.
IMO voting for a list or for individual candidates doesn’t present such a risk. At this point, the real issue we’re facing is the lack of qualified candidates. We have to reach out directly to people that we believe would be a good fit. I don’t know of a single instance of someone willing to participate in a council and failing to do so because of the list-based voting system.
Anyone can form their own list, so competition can occur between lists. So far there was no one suggesting a list, so we’ll only have the one the Association has been assembling. It’s fine at this early stage of the DAO. When there will be more at stake, new candidates will get involved, and the system will adapt with the then-chosen voting system.
Thank you for sharing your perspective. While aiming to enhance agility and reduce bureaucracy is important, shifting to a list-based voting system may not achieve these goals and could introduce significant issues:
Ineffectiveness of the Current Council Despite intentions for agility, the council has become bureaucratic, with operational decisions like market openings taking ages. This centralization contradicts agility and may worsen under a list-based system by consolidating power.
Complexity and Opacity of List Formation Building a candidate list is complex and less transparent, acting as a “black box” that discourages participation. In contrast, an individual-based system is more accessible, encouraging more candidates to step forward.
Availability of Qualified Candidates The claim of a “lack of qualified candidates” may not reflect reality. Many individuals might run in an individual-based system, allowing the community to decide who is qualified. Pre-selecting candidates via lists could exclude capable contributors and ignore the community’s preferences.
Accountability and Representation Electing individuals ensures direct accountability. Some current council members have left the project, raising concerns about their ongoing contributions. A single list may include such members without giving the community a chance to reassess their suitability.
Risk of Power Consolidation A list-based system can concentrate power among a select few, reducing diversity of thought and marginalizing minority voices. This undermines the DAO’s democratic principles and can lead to groupthink.
Conclusion
Switching to a list-based voting system may inadvertently increase bureaucracy, reduce transparency, and decrease member engagement—the very issues it aims to solve. Maintaining an individual-based election system promotes accountability, encourages wider participation, and upholds democratic values. Instead of altering the voting system, we should focus on improving candidate outreach, transparency, and inclusivity to strengthen governance and achieve true agility.
At this stage, I think that having a list is great so there are coherent team members able to work together.
@TimerJ if you want to suggest a list and/or participate as a council member, you’re most welcome to reach out to @philh or directly post your list/application on the forum.
The goal here isn’t about simply having “coherent” team members; it’s about ensuring enough individuals are in place to represent a variety of perspectives. Right now, as per your last report, the Council seems more like a “black box,” with limited transparency and diversity of views.
In line with the DAO’s decentralized nature, I propose we put this to a DAO vote to decide on the election system. The options could be:
A: List system
B: Individual system
Let the community/stakeholders choose, as we are a DAO, right?
I understand that you prefer members to apply individually. You made your points, and we heard you. However, this is not the way we intend to proceed in this current instance.
The Council has decided to use a list-based model. The governance model voted on by the general governance has no specific requirements in that regard; hence, we will move forward with this decision. We want to run the election swiftly, as key decisions are left pending (we’ll need to allocate MGV budgets to support the upcoming launch of vaults).
If you want to reverse this decision, you’ll need to submit a proposal to the DAO. Instructions for doing so are available on the forum.